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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] We have now had more than a year to assess the impact of the 2006
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“the Amendments”)
on discovery of electronically stored information.1 At the core of these
provisions is the “two-tiered” discovery process.2
Under Rule
3
26(b)(2)(B), restyled as “Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored

* Copyright © 2008 Thomas Y. Allman. Mr. Allman, a former General Counsel, was an
early advocate of federal e-discovery reform and currently co-chairs the Lawyers for
Civil Justice State E-Discovery Committee. He is one of the Editors of The Sedona
Principles (Second Edition 2007) and can be reached at tyallman@earthlink.net.
1
The 2006 Amendments to Rule 34(a) added “electronically stored information” as a
distinct category of discoverable information to update the 1970 amendments, which had
expanded the definition of “documents” to include “data compilations” from which
information could be obtained by use of “detection devices.”
2
See Final Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee of May 25, 2005 (revised July
27, 2005), at page C-42, included as Appendix C to the September 2005 Standing
Committee Report to the Judicial Conference, available at
http://www.www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf [hereinafter “Final Report
(2005)”]
3
Fed. R. Civ. 26(b)(2)(B) regulates all forms of discovery but identical provisions were
added to Fed. R. Civ. 45(d)(1)(D) relating to subpoenas. The reference to Rule
26(b)(2)(B) in this article refers to both provisions.
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Information,”4 a party is permitted to utilize information from “reasonably
accessible” sources of electronically stored information to respond to all
forms of discovery without seeking information from inaccessible sources,
provided that they are identified.5 Reasonably accessible sources are those
which are available without “undue burden or cost.”
[2] What can be said of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) after one year?6 The approach
was motivated by the observation that “more easily accessed sources –
whether computer-based, paper, or human – may yield all the information
that is reasonably useful for the action.”7 Are parties actually producing
and reviewing accessible information first in the average cases? 8 Is it
helpful to require a court to evaluate “accessibility” and “good cause” as a
condition of second tier discovery rather than simply directing the courts
to apply Rule 26(b)(2)(C)9? Whether a source is “reasonably accessible”
or not, the “proportionality principle” found in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) –
weighing the perceived benefits against the burdens involved – may
prevent discovery from being ordered.10
Isn’t the “good cause”
requirement creating unnecessary work for the courts?
4

Descriptive titles, but no text changes, were added to both rules by “stylistic”
amendments effective as of December 1, 2007. All references and quotations in this
article are to post-stylistic revision versions unless otherwise noted.
5
The Rule provides that “[a] party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of
undue burden or cost.” See Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 62 (D.D.C. 2007)
(explaining that Rule 26(b)(2)(B) makes “explicit” the “obligation to search available
electronic systems for the information demanded” and is only relieved upon a showing of
undue burden or cost).
6
I have previously described the Rule in the pages of this Journal as “an innovative and
practical resolution to the concerns identified…about e-discovery.” Thomas Y. Allman,
The Impact of the Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules, 12 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 13 at *6
(2006).
7
Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C-42.
8
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), Committee Note (2006) (a party “should obtain and evaluate
information” from reasonably accessible sources before insisting on production from
inaccessible sources”).
9
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) requires that a “court must limit the frequency or extent
of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or local rules if it determines [that] “the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. . . . “ (emphasis
added).
10
See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2008.1 at n.7 (2d ed. 2007) ( Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) is
identical to former Rule 26(b)(iii)).
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[3] Also, what has been the impact of the two-tiered approach on
compliance with preservation obligations?11
[4] This article seeks to answer these questions through the prism of the
reported decisions and the actual conduct of parties under the Rule. The
results of the reported cases to date are interesting. It is difficult to detect
any change in the outcomes from what would have been anticipated before
the Amendments. If a party is unable to sustain its burden of showing that
the source of information is “not reasonably accessible,” discovery
ordinarily proceeds.12 “Good cause” for discovery from inaccessible
sources is typically not found when substantially similar information may
be available on more accessible sources13 or if accessible sources are
unduly burdensome to produce because of the volume or other factors. 14
Some courts continue to resolve objections to discovery of electronic

11

The scope of what must be preserved may be broader than that found on accessible
sources and even inaccessible information may need to be listed in the initial disclosures
required under Rule 26(a). See Frank P. DeGiulio, Electronic Discovery: A Practicum
for the Maritime Lawyer, 19 U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 1, 21 (2006-2007).
12
Autoclub Family Insurance v. Ahner, No. 05-5723, 2007 WL 248 0322 (E.D. La. Aug.
29, 2007) (“Rimkus must make an evidentiary showing that the data sought is not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost [and subpoenaing party] is not
required to show good cause to overcome Rimkus’s unsupported assertions.”) (emphasis
in original); accord, Disability Rights Council v. WMTA, 242 F.R.D. 139, 147-148 (D.D.
C. 2007) (holding that the considerations for finding “good cause” listed in the
Committee Note provide an “overwhelming case for production of the backup tapes”);
Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Lieberman (Ameriwood I), No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL
3825291, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006) (finding “good cause” to order inspection of
hard drive).
13
Best Buy Stores v. Developers Diversified Realty Corporation, No. 05-2310
(DSD/JJG), 2007 WL 4230806, *1-2 (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2007) (reversing Magistrate
order finding “good cause” requiring restoration of inaccessible backup tapes because
information could likely be found elsewhere); see also Hunter v. Ohio Indemnity Co.,
No. C 06-3524 JSW (JL), 2007 WL 2769805, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2007) (citing
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) for the proposition that “a court is [authorized] to limit discovery if it is
obtainable from another source that is less burdensome or if the burden outweighs its
likely benefit.”).
14
See Ameriwood Industries v. Liberman (Ameriwood II) No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2007
WL 496716 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 2007) (refusing discovery from accessible source because
of undue burdens involved).
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information by balancing burden and benefit without reference to Rule
26(b)(2)(B).15
[5] The two-tiered approach appears to have had, however, a positive
impact on how parties manage their discovery responsibilities under the
Amendments. Early discussions, case management orders,16 and local
rules17 routinely encourage parties to focus on the burdens of access, and
anecdotal evidence indicates that parties are accommodating reasonable
demands for limitations based on accessibility.18 Moreover, courts appear
to be showing heightened restraint when there has already been a full and
adequate search19 or when a requesting party has not demonstrated the
absence of reasonably accessible alternatives.20
[6] In addition, there also seems to be recognition that preservation
requirements for inaccessible information must be identified early or they

15

See, e.g., Oxford House v. City of Topeka, No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 WL 1246200 at
*5(D. Kans. Apr. 27, 2007) (applying “marginal utility analysis” to backup media and
determining that “[a]s the likelihood of retrieving these electronic communications is low
and the cost high,” the objection to retrieval of the data should be sustained).
16
See Celexa and Lexapro Product Liability, No. MDL 1736, 2006 WL 3497757 (E.D.
Mo. Nov. 13, 2006) (absent exceptional circumstances and showing of special need, no
duty to restore sample backup tapes retained for purposes of litigation).
17
See NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO DEFAULT STANDARD FOR DISCOVERY OF
ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION, APP. K (“Prior to the Rule 26(f) conference,
the parties [should discuss whether] . . . electronically stored information [is] of limited
accessibility [such as] those created or used by electronic media no longer in use,
maintained in redundant electronic storage media, or for which retrieval involves
substantial cost.”), available at
http://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/Clerk_s_Office/Local_Rules/AppendixK.pdf
18
When the author floated the question at a recent Georgetown Law Center E-Discovery
Conference, numerous members of the audience asserted that the meet and confer process
was yielding practical accommodations as a direct result of Rule 26(b)(2)(B).
19
See Palgut v.City of Colorado Springs, No. 06-dc-01142-WDM-MJW, 2007 WL
4277564, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2007) (“[A]n adequate and full search” had already
occurred).
20
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., No. 04-CV-5032, 2007 WL 2106098
(S.D. N.Y. July 21, 2007) (refusing to order restoration and search of backup-up tapes
because the requesting party had not demonstrated that responsive e-mails existed on the
tapes); accord, Best Buy Stores v. Developers Diversitfied Realty Corporation, No. 052310 (DSD/JJG), 2007 WL 4230806 (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2007).
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are waived,21 and that the principle of proportionality is equally applicable
in the preservation context.
[7] Nonetheless, the “two-tiered” process can be cumbersome to
implement, and there remain questions about its usefulness. Thus, the
article includes practical suggestions on how to overcome the remaining
barriers to reaching the full promise of the Rule.
II. BACKGROUND
[8] The ubiquity of computers in the storage and exchange of electronic
information has led to an information explosion.22 The trend started with
mainframe computers which had the ability to manipulate large volumes
of information in the form of “databases.” This inevitably attracted
requests for production of information in electronic form and, in 1970,
Rule 34(a) was amended to include as discoverable documents, “data
compilations from which information can be obtained.”
[9] By the mid to late 1990s, however, the growth in discovery of e-mail
and other forms of electronic information had overwhelmed the discovery
rules. An enormous volume of information23 was potentially available for
discovery on active systems, backup media and, in some cases, as
fragments on hard drives, greatly impeding the ability to manage
discovery in rational ways. The problem was especially acute because of
21

See Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell, No. 2:06-cv-01093 FMC-JCx, 2007 WL 2080419,
at *14 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007), motion to review denied, 245 F.R.D. 443, 447-48 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 24, 2007 (denying sanctions for failure to preserve information temporarily
stored in RAM, where based on good faith belief, it was not required and no “specific
request” had been made).
22
George Paul and Jason Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?, 13
RICH. J. L. & TECH. 10 at *47 - 49 (2007); Id. at *9 (“[caused by the] quick succession of
advances clustered or synced together [including]…digitization,; real time computing; the
microprocessor; the personal computer; e-mail; local and wide-area networks leading to
the Internet; the evolution of software, which has ‘locked in’ seamless editing as an
almost universal function; the World Wide Web; and of course people and their
technique.”)
23
Id. at *12. Other types of information phenomena, some of which “may yet even
eclipse total e-mail traffic,” include instant messaging, word processing with hyperlinks,
integrated voice mail in ‘.wav’ file format, structured databases of all kinds, Web pages,
blogs, and e-data in all conceivable form[s].” Id at *21.
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the impact of preservation obligations on business practices involving
routine overwriting of information.24 When set against the requirements
of Rule 1, the practice of discovery under existing rules presented serious
issues.25
[10] When the Civil Rules Advisory Committee and its Discovery
Subcommittee26 turned to electronic discovery in 2000, it was confronted
with a variety of conflicting proposals.27 Clearly, the discovery rules had
to be updated to effectively carry out their historic mission.28
[11] For a variety of reasons, including uncertainty of the technologies
which might emerge in the future, the Advisory Committee chose to make
only modest changes designed to clarify that electronically stored
information stood on the same footing as documents and reflecting best
managing practices.29 As noted by one commentator, the Amendments
24

See Public Hearing on the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Hearing Before the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (Feb. 11, 2005) (statement of Lawrence La Sala,
Assistant General Counsel, Textron Corporation) (stating that the threat that
implementing even a legitimate policy could subject a company to sanctions, has delayed
or even scuttled the implementation of corporate electronic data retention policies),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ediscovery/CVHearingFeb2005.pdf#page=369 (last visited Feb. 9, 2008).
25
See FED R. CIV. P. 1. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the
rules be “construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.” Id.
26
The Advisory Committee of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States charged with proposing rules
under the authority of the Enabling Act.
27
Professor Marcus, the special Consultant to the Committee, has identified some of the
ideas as including: (1) declaring that e-mail was not discoverable, since not a
“document;” (2) mandating “reasonable” electronic recordkeeping; (3) requiring that
backup tapes always be searched; (4) requiring that the requesting party always pay for
restoration of backup tapes; and (5) mandating the exact form of production of
electronically stored information. Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward
Brave New World or 1984?, 236 F.R.D. 598, 609-610 (2006).
28
See Prof. Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE
L. J. 561, 627 (2001) (arguing that “[t]o continue to employ pre-computer discovery
standards . . . would be the technological equivalent of driving a horse and buggy down
Interstate 94”).
29
See Final Report (2005), supra note 2, C-44 (“Parties sophisticated in discovery first
look in the reasonably accessible places that are likely to produce responsive information.
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“are intended to fill in gaps in the existing rules so that the task of
conducting (and responding to) electronic discovery is less burdensome
and more cost-effective.”30
[12] Included among the Amendments was a unique provision for the
sequence of the discovery of electronically stored information embodied
in Rule 26(b)(2)(B). Appendix A [Evolution of the Two-Tiered Approach
(1983 - 2007)] to this article details the steps in the amendment process,
with links to the relevant materials.
III. THE TWO-TIERED APPROACH
[13] The Federal Rules permit discovery as to “any matter, not privileged,
that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”31 From the high
point of open-ended discovery prior to 1983,32 successive amendments in
199333 and 200034 increased the managerial role of courts in discovery and
the 2006 Amendments continue that trend.35
. . . In many cases, discovery obtained from accessible sources will be sufficient to meet
the needs of the case. If [not], the proposed rule allows that party to obtain additional
discovery . . . subject to judicial supervision.”).
30
Robert K. Lu, New Federal Rules on E-Discovery, 29 L.A. LAW 12 (June 2006)
(“Strictly speaking, these new rules are not so much amendments as they are additions to
the existing rules governing pretrial civil discovery.”).
31
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). The discovery rules “allow[s] the responding party to search
his records to produce the required, relevant data [but generally do] not give the
requesting party the right to conduct the actual search.” In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d
1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003).
32
The 1983 amendments introduced the “proportionality” principle to Rule 26(b)(2)(iii)
requiring limitations on discovery when the “burden or expense” of the proposed
discovery “outweighs its likely benefit.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
33
The 1993 amendments limited the frequency of the use of specific discovery tools
while adding initial disclosure requirements to Rule 26(a). See FED R. CIV. P. 26(a),
Committee Note on 1993 Amendments.
34
The 2000 amendments limited the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) to material
which is relevant to the “claims or defenses” of any party, subject to expansion for “good
cause” to encompass any matter relevant to the “subject matter” involved in the action.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), Committee Note on 2000 Amendments.
35
Scholarly comment has tended to see an inevitable trend towards increased managerial
judging in this process. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the
Federal Rules – And the Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L.
REV. 191, 198-202 (2007) (“Discovery must be a fearsome Gulliver to require all those
strings, and others that I may have overlooked, to tie him down.”).

7

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 3

[14] Courts are required to limit all forms of discovery when the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Thus, a
court must limit or deny unduly burdensome discovery whether the
information sought is accessible or not.36
Even “active data or
information” in electronic form can be unduly burdensome to discover.37
[15] In the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(b), the Advisory Committee
established the principle, uniquely applicable to electronically stored
information, that a producing party may ignore “sources”38 of
electronically stored information which are not reasonably accessible in
their initial discovery responses. Rule 26(b)(2)(B) authorizes them to do
so, provided that they “identify” any such sources to the requesting party
which arguably contain discoverable information.39 The Advisory
Committee believed that this was reflective of current best practices and
that “stating in the rule that initial production of information that is not
reasonably accessible is not required simply recognizes reality.”40

36

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule
26(b)(2)(C).”). The Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) observes that “[t]he limitations
of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) continue to apply to all discovery of electronically stored
information, including that stored on reasonably accessible sources.” FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(B), Committee Note (2006).
37
See BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN, RONALD J. HEDGES, AND ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS,
MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES at
8 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/eldscpkt.pdf (last visited Feb. 9,
2008) (stating that “active data may involve substantial burdens to produce – for
example, when vast amounts are requested or when data are requested in a form that
requires the reprogramming of databases.”).
38
Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C-50. The reference to “sources” was added after
the Public Hearings in recognition of the concern that a party cannot describe the precise
nature of inaccessible information for which it has not searched. The Advisory
Committee also added the qualification that the sources must be inaccessible because of
“undue burden or cost.”
39
Id. at C-44.
40
Given that sources of information which are regarded as inaccessible may be subjected
to discovery, a party must consider its preservation obligations even if it identifies a
source as inaccessible. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), Committee Note (2006) (“Whether a
responding party is required to preserve unsearched sources of potentially responsive
information that it believes are not reasonably accessible depends on the circumstance of
each case. It is often useful for the parties to discuss this issue early in discovery.”).
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[16] A requesting party may nonetheless obtain discovery from
inaccessible sources by filing a motion to compel and “showing good
cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”41 Because the
Rule is coupled to and includes the requirement that the court “consider”
the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C), it “carries forward to today’s
electronic world the concepts of proportionality, balance and common
sense embedded in the 1983 amendment to Rule 26(b).”42
[17] This “two-tiered” approach deliberately mirrors the structure
included in Rule 26(b)(1) in 2000, which also invokes “good cause” as a
necessary condition to enhanced discovery beyond that relevant to “claims
or defenses.”43
[18] If party managed discussions regarding the scope of discovery do not
succeed, either party – not just the requesting party – may bring any
remaining dispute to the reviewing court by filing a motion to compel or a
motion seeking a protective order.44
IV. REASONABLY ACCESSIBLE SOURCES
[19] The underlying concept of the two-tiered approach is a distinction
between information found on sources which are “not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost” and information available on
their opposite, i.e., “reasonably accessible” sources. Inaccessible sources
may be ignored in party managed discovery although their existence must
be disclosed through the identification process if they may contain
41

While that Rule has three distinct segments to it, by far the most important and relevant
one for these purposes is (iii), which provides that discovery should be limited if “the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed
discovery in resolving the issues.”
42
Letter from Arthur Miller, Professor, Harvard Law School and former Reporter to the
Advisory Comm., to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/04-CV-219.pdf.
43
Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C-43 (“The amendment builds on the two-tier
structure of scope of discovery defined in Rule 26(b)(1) and applies this structure to
discovery of electronically stored information.”).
44
Id. at C-50 (noting that the ability to seek a protective order was added to guarantee
that either party could raise the issue).

9

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 3

discoverable information. And, of course, if “good cause” exists, an
inaccessible source may still have to be utilized in discovery.
[20] The Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) observed that “[i]t is not
possible to define in a rule the different types of technological features that
may affect the burdens and costs of accessing electronically stored
information.” Ultimately, the concept is an elastic one which has as its
focus the burden and costs involved in providing discovery. In Parkdale
America LLC v. Travelers,45 a producing party sought to use the
burdensome nature of privilege review as an argument for a finding of
inaccessibility.
Had the argument succeeded,46 production could
nonetheless have been ordered for “good cause,” taking into account the
proportionality principle, but with limitations on the scope or timing of the
discovery.
[21] At least three approaches are currently in use to help determine
which side of the “reasonably accessible” line (actually more of a sliding
scale) a particular source may fall.
A. ACTIVE DATA
[22] One end of the accessibility scale is firmly anchored by sources of
“active data.” Information which is “active” is “immediately accessible
without restoration or reconstruction,” and is typically stored on local hard
drives, networked servers, distributed devices, or offline archival sources.
47
Principle 8 of The Sedona Principles (Second Edition 2007)48 contrasts
45

Parkdale Am., LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Of Am., Inc., No. 3:06CV78-R, 2007 WL
4165247, at *12 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2007) (stating that the party did not establish that emails were not reasonably accessible under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) “particularly in light of the
Court’s ability to apportion costs….”).
46
But cf. Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, No. M8-85 (PART 1) (CSH), 2007 WL
473703 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007) (transferring a similar argument for decision to District
Court where underlying action was pending).
47
The Sedona Conference Glossary: E-Discovery & Digital Information Management 2
(2d ed. Dec. 2007), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSCGlossary_12_07.pdf; see
also RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1996) (defining “accessible” as
“able to be used, entered, or reached.”).
48
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, PRINCIPLE EIGHT ii (2d ed. 2007),
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“active data and information,” with “disaster recovery backup tapes and
other sources of electronically stored information that are not reasonably
accessible.”
[23] Some of the more exotic forms of active data have been found to be
accessible where they can be accessed with minimal effort. In the case of
Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell,49 information which was temporarily stored
in RAM was held to be accessible and thus subject to discovery.50 The
District Judge upheld a Magistrate Judge’s order to compel production
after applying Rule 26(b)(2)(B),51 while simultaneously agreeing that no
duty to preserve existed.52
[24] However, even active data can be inaccessible for Rule 26(b)(2)(B)
purposes when undue burden or cost attends its use in discovery. As

available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf;
see also Thomas Y. Allman, The Sedona Principle (2d ed.): Accommodating the 2006
Amendments, FED. CTS. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2008). The Sedona approach is
analogous to that adopted by the Guidelines for State Trial Courts adopted by the
Conference of State Chief Justices.
49
Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMCJCX, 2007 WL 2080419
(C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007), motion to review denied, 245 F.R.D. 443 (Aug. 24, 2007)
(requiring future production of information temporarily stored in RAM for less than six
hours).
50
Id. at * 7 (“[T]he court finds that it would not be an undue burden on defendants to
employ a technical mechanism through which retention of Server Log Data in RAM is
enabled”).
51
Id. at *13 (“[D]efendants have failed to demonstrate that the Server Log Data is not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost [and, in any event] plaintiffs have
shown good cause to order discovery of such data . . . and the burden and expense of the
proposed discovery does not outweigh its likely benefit…”).
52
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 448 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
[This decision] simply requires that the defendants in this case, as part
of this litigation, after the issuance of a court order, and following a
careful evaluation of the burden to these defendants of preserving and
producing the specific information requested in light of its relevance
and the lack of other available means to preserve it, begin preserving
and subsequently produce a particular subset of the data in RAM under
Defendants’ control.
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noted earlier, in Parkdale America LLC v. Travelers,53 a producing party
unsuccessfully argued that e-mail was inaccessible because of the
heightened need for review to determine privilege. While the argument
failed in that case,54 other cases may require sufficiently excruciating
review to lead to a different result.55
B. COST-SHIFTING ANALOGIES
[25] The Advisory Committee borrowed the “reasonably accessible”
concept from cases that used it to exclude sources from eligibility for costshifting.56 Not surprisingly, courts have continued to consult cases from
that context, such as Zubulake v. UBS Warburg (“Zubulake I”),57 for
possible analogies. In Zubulake I, the court identified five categories of
data, from most accessible to least accessible, as “active, online data;”
“near-line data;” “offline storage/archives;” “backup tapes;” and “erased,
fragmented or damaged data.”58 In W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst,59 the

53

Parkdale Am., LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Of Am., Inc., No. 3:06CV78-R, 2007 WL
4165247, at *12 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2007) (e-mails were reasonably accessible under
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) “particularly in light of the Court’s ability to apportion costs….”).
54
But cf. Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, No. M8-85 (PART 1)(CSH), 2007 WL
473703 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007) (transferring a similar argument for decision to District
Court where underlying action was pending).
55
See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 789, 806 (E.D. La. 2007) ([quoting
from Special Master Report] “Merck cannot be permitted to deprive adversaries of
discovery by voluntarily choosing to electronically superimpose [its] legal advice on the
non-privileged and, therefore, discoverable, communications”).
56
Under Rule 26(b)(2)(B), however, the concepts of accessibility and cost-shifting are
“decoupled;” if undue burden or cost is involved in regard to discovery, a court may deny
or otherwise adjust discovery or condition it on payment of discovery costs, regardless of
the accessibility of the source involved.
57
Zubulake v. USB Warburg, LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 321-322 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)(ordering sample consisting of any five backup tapes as selected by Zubulake and
announcing a seven factor test to be applied after results of the sample became available);
see also Zubulake v. USB Warburg, LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)(ordering production from all backup tapes based on sample).
58
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318-19. The court drew the line between accessible and
inaccessible at “backup tapes, “because [they] must be restored using a process [as
described] all before the data is usable. That makes such data inaccessible.” Some of the
technological assumptions employed may no longer be applicable in the highly regulated
and predictable storage classification world in which the Zubulake decision was decided.
59
W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst, 245 F.R.D. 38, 43 (D. Mass. 2007).
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court held that information was inaccessible by analogy “because of
BeneFirst’s method of storage and lack of an indexing system.”
[26] Some commentators have suggested that parties should “game” the
cost shifting cases to favor their accessibility positions, given that the cost
shifting cases were driven by considerations which differ from those
underlying Rule 26(b)(2)(B).60
C. STORAGE TYPES
[27] The Advisory Committee listed representative storage types which
were inaccessible in its 2005 Final Report.61 Thus, removable backup
tapes, which require a burdensome restoration process before the contents
are accessed, were listed as inaccessible sources of information.62 Other
examples cited were databases not programmed to provide answers,
legacy data, and deleted information requiring forensic retrieval.63 Some
courts have applied these examples as accessibility benchmarks. In
Phoenix Four v. Strategic Resources Corporation,64 for example,
information in a partitioned section of a hard drive was found to be not
reasonably accessible by analogy to the “legacy” systems described in the
Final Report.65
60

In a candid article appearing in the publication of the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, it was suggested that “if a producing party cites case law applying cost-shifting
tests to particular types of data, plaintiff lawyers should argue that these cases are not
directly relevant to the tier-one analysis.” Marian K. Riedy & Suman Beros, Win the
Battle for Access to E-Data, 42 TRIAL 49, 53 (Dec. 2006)(noting that “[o]n the other
hand,” a plaintiff lawyer should cite cost-shifting cases if they hold that it is
“inappropriate for certain types of electronic data.”) (emphasis in original).
61
See Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C-42.
62
See generally Eric Friedberg, To Recycle or Not to Recycle, That is the Hot Backup
Tape Question, 201 PLI/CRIM 205, 211-212 (2006) (discussing when and how to
preserve relevant e-mails on backup media).
63
See WRIGHT, MILLER, & MARCUS, supra note 10, at §2008.2.
64
Phoenix Four v. Strategic Res. Corp., No. 05 Civ 4837 (HB), 2006 WL 1409413, at *2,
*6 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006) (stating that “proposed Rule 26(b)(2)[sic] reinforces the
concept that a party must identify even those sources that are ‘not reasonably accessible,”
but exempts the party from having to provide discovery from such sources unless its
adversary moves to compel discovery.”).
65
See Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C-42 (referring to “legacy data that remains
from obsolete systems and is unintelligible on the successor system.”); see also Palgut v.
City of Colo. Springs, No.06-cv-01142-WDM-MJW, 2007 WL 4277564, at *3 (D. Colo.
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V. “GOOD CAUSE” FOR DISCOVERY
[28] Rule 26(b)(2)(B) permits discovery from sources which are not
reasonably accessible if the requesting party establishes “good cause,
subject to the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”66 The invocation of a
“good cause” requirement expresses a substantial hurdle to discovery.67
The court must not only determine if need and relevance exists, but must
also balance the “burden or expense of the proposed discovery [to
determine] if it outweighs its likely benefit,” taking into account a number
of considerations.68

Dec. 3, 2007) ( refusing to order restoration of inaccessible backup tapes because “the
Defendant City of Colorado [does] not have the hardware to access them.”).
66
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
67
See Schlagenhaff v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 121 (1964)(while the Federal Rules should
be liberally construed to grant discovery, “they should not be expanded by disregarding
plainly expressed limitations” such as a “good cause” requirement). A court should
carefully weigh any potential disruption to business and information system activities
which may result. THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS &
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, PRINCIPLE EIGHT
(2d ed. 2007), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf
Resort[ing] to disaster recovery backup tapes and other sources of
electronically stored information that are not reasonably accessible
requires the requesting party to demonstrate need and relevance that
outweigh the costs and burdens of retrieving and processing the
electronically stored information from such sources, including the
disruption of business and information management activities.
Id.
68
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). The Committee Note suggests factors which may be
appropriate for a court to “consider” in reaching its decision :
Appropriate considerations may include: (1) the specificity of the
discovery request; (2) the quantify of information available from other
and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant
information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available
on more easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant,
responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily
accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of
the further information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation; and (7) the parties resources.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), Committee Note (2006).
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A. CASES FINDING GOOD CAUSE
[29] In December, 2006, shortly after the Rule went into effect, the court
in Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Lieberman (“Ameriwood I”),69 concluded
that good cause existed to authorize the creation of a mirror image of a
hard drive. The 2006 Amendments had “clarified” that Rule 34 authorizes
direct access to this type of information.70 The same result was reached in
Thielen v. Buongiorno USA, Inc.71 because the moving party had
demonstrated a “viable reason” for the discovery.
[30] In W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst, L.L.C.,72 the court found good
cause to order production of inaccessible claim files based on the
“considerations” listed in the Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2)(B). In the
case of In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation,73 a court held
that there was “good cause” to order restoration of e-mail backup tapes
because “it has not been demonstrated that [the e-mails sought are]
reasonably available from any other easily accessed sources” and
resources “are not an issue.”74 Similarly, in Disability Rights Council v.

69

Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman (Ameriwood I), No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL
3825291 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006).
70
Rule 34(a) added an express right to “inspect, copy, test or sample” designated
“electronically stored information” to the existing right to do so with respect to “tangible”
things. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a), Committee Note (2006) (“The current rule [was] not
clear that such testing or sampling is authorized; the amendment expressly permits it.”).
The Note further cautioned that “[a]s with any other form of discovery, issues of burden
and intrusiveness raised by [such requests] can be addressed under Rules 26(b)(2) and
26(c) [but] [t]he addition of testing and sampling to Rule 34(a) . . . is not meant to create
a routine right of direct access to a party’s electronic information system, although such
access might be justified in some circumstances.”).
71
Thielen v. Buongiorno USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-16, 2007 WL 465680, at *2 (W.D.
Mich. Feb 8, 2007).
72
W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst, L.L.C., 245 F.R.D. 38 (D. Mass. 2007).
73
In re Veeco Instrumetns, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 MD 1695, 2007 WL 983987, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007).
74
Id. at *2. It can be argued that the burden with regard to other sources of information
should have been placed on the requesting party to show that the information was not so
available.
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WMTA,75 the Court held that there was an “overwhelming case for
production of the backup tapes.”76
[31] The logic used to reach these outcomes is consistent with that
employed by the decisions rendered prior to the 2006 Amendments. In
Concord Boat Corporation v. Brunswick Corporation,77 the court
concluded that restoration of backup media was not warranted because the
“questionable” gains were “outweighed by the substantial burden and
expense of conducting the search.”78 In Zubulake I,79 however, the court
ordered restoration of a sample of backup media selected by the requesting
party, the results of which were subsequently held to justify full
restoration.80
[32] Good cause has also been found in other factual contexts. In Guy
Chemical Company v. Romaco AG,81 the court noted that “there [was] no
other location where [the requesting party] could turn to acquire the
requested discovery.” Similarly, the District Judge in Columbia Pictures
v. Bunnell82 upheld a Magistrate Judge’s ruling that good cause existed to
compel production of information temporarily stored in RAM because “it
would not be an undue burden on defendants to employ a technical

75

Disability Rights Council of Greater Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D.
129, 148 (D.D.C. 2007).
76
Id. The court applied the factors listed in the Committee Note but expressed
reservations about whether the benefits of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) could be claimed by a party
which failed to disable features which automatically deleted e-mail after sixty days.
77
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *9
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997).
78
McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001) (adopting a marginal utility test
utilizing sampling to determine if the necessity existed to order burdensome restoration,
an approach echoed in Zubulake v. USB Warburg, LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309
(2003)).
79
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
80
See Zubulake v. USB Warburg, LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 287 (2003)
(ordering production from backup tapes based on results of sample).
81
Guy Chem. Co. v. Romaco AG, 243 F.R.D. 310, 312 (N.D. Ind. 2007).
82
Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093, 2007 WL 2080419, at *3-6
(C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007), motion to review denied, 245 F.R.D. 443 (Aug. 24, 2007)
(requiring future production of information temporarily stored in RAM for less than six
hours).
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mechanism through which retention of Server Log Data in RAM is
enabled.”83
B. CASES DECLINING TO FIND GOOD CAUSE
[33] Courts have refused to find “good cause” to order discovery from
inaccessible sources where the potential benefits did not outweigh the
burdens and costs. The results in those cases are also consistent with
decisions rendered under similar circumstances prior to the Amendments.
[34] In Best Buy Stores v. Developers Diversified Realty Corporation84
the District Court reversed a Magistrate Judge’s order requiring restoration
of inaccessible backup tapes85 after carefully analyzing the elements of the
“good cause exception.” It noted that the defendants had not argued or
shown that the information was uniquely available from the database at
issue or that it could not be more easily obtained from another more
accessible source. Similarly, in Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Liberman
(“Ameriwood II”), the defendants failed to demonstrate good cause “to
order disclosure of [voluminous] communications and documents.”86
[35] Other cases have reached similar results by simply referencing the
proportionality principle. In Oxford House v. City of Topeka,87 the court
denied discovery because “the likelihood of retrieving these electronic
communications [from backup media] is low and the cost high.”
Similarly, a District Judge ruled in National Union Fire Insurance v.
83

Id. at * 7. (“[D]efendants have failed to demonstrate that the Server Log Data is not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost [and, in any event] plaintiffs have
shown good cause to order discovery of such data . . . and the burden and expense of the
proposed discovery does not outweigh its likely benefit….”). Id. at*13
84
Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., No. 05-2310, 2007 WL
4230806, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2007).
85
Id. at *3. The court held that because of the high cost to restore and maintain the
information the tape “is not at present reasonably accessible” and refused to hold that a
duty had existed to preserve the information in accessible form merely because it was
“potentially relevant to virtually any litigation . . . because of the quantity and nature of
the information it contained.”
86
Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman (Ameriwood II), No. 4:06CV524, 2007 WL
496716 (E.D. Mo. Feb.13, 2007).
87
Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 WL 1246200, at *5(D.
Kans. Apr. 27, 2007).
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Clearwater Insurance Company,88 that restoration of e-mails from backup
tapes was not required under the facts of that case since “the expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” In Palgut v. City of
Colorado Springs,89 the court refused to order restoration of backup tapes
where “an adequate and full search” had occurred and the “cost of
restoration outweighs the possible yield of relevant and probative
information.”
VI. THE IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
[36] Rule 26(b)(2)(B) requires “identification” of unsearched sources as a
condition of treating electronically stored information as not reasonably
accessible. The duty to identify extends only to those sources reasonably
believed to contain discoverable information. The Rule does not spell out
exactly when or how “identification” must occur,90 although the
Committee Note suggested listing the “category or type” of the source.91
[37] Failure to comply with this unique requirement could, in theory, have
serious consequences.92 Some have, accordingly, argued that preparation
of detailed “privilege-type” logs is advisable or even required.93 However,
88

Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., No. 04-CV-5032, 2007 WL 2106098,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2007)
89
Palgut v. City of Colo. Springs, No. 06-cv-01142, 2007 WL 4277564, at *2 (D.Colo.
Dec. 3, 2007).
90
The purpose of “identification” is to assist the requesting party to determine if further
steps should be taken. It was added to offset criticisms that “self-designation” of
inaccessible sources is likely to be abused. See Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C44 (stating that the identification requirement is “an improvement over the present
practice, in which parties simply do not produce inaccessible electronically stored
information….”).
91
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), Committee Note (2006) (“The identification should, to the
extent possible, provide enough detail to enable the requesting party to evaluate the
burdens and costs of providing the discovery and the likelihood of finding responsive
information on the identified sources.”).
92
Compare the result in Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, No.
CV-F-04-6121 LJO DLB, 2007 WL 4365584, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2007), where a
court refused to entertain a motion to recover the costs of an e-discovery vendor because
of a failure to raise the accessibility concerns by objection or motion during the discovery
process.
93
But see Lee H. Rosenthal, “A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery After December 1,
2006,” 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167, 178 (2006) (“[P]rivilege logs epitomize the
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in most cases, identification needs will be met through use of one or more
of the opportunities available under the Amendments to disclose the
information.
[38] In some cases, for example, identification will be part of the initial
disclosures under Rule 26(a).94 Initial disclosures of potential sources not
being searched, known to otherwise be within the scope of the rule, must
be made “at, or within, fourteen days” of the Rule 27(f) meeting,95 unless
delayed by stipulation or court order. Perhaps more typically, however,
identification will occur as a byproduct of the informal exchanges about
potential sources which naturally occur during development of a discovery
plan prior to or at96 the Rule 26(f) conference. Finally, formal responses
to discovery can, and should, articulate or “identify” sources not being
searched if they arguably may contain discoverable information.97 As
suggested by Sedona Principle 4, “responses and objections to discovery”
should clearly articulate “the scope and limits of what is being produced,”
thus satisfying the intent of the Rule.
[39] No reported decisions have yet involved allegations of a failure to
make “identification.”

worst features of discovery: they are expensive; they take forever; and when finished they
are rarely used.”).
94
See Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C-23 (“The obligation [under Rule 26(a), as
amended by the 2006 Amendments] does not force a premature search, but only requires
disclosure, either initially or by way of supplementation, of information that the
disclosing party has decided it may use to support its case.”). Compare the discussion in
Frank DeGiulio, Electronic discovery: A Practicum for the Maritime Lawyer, 19 U.S.F.
MAR. L. J. 1, 21 (2006-2007) (“[T]he committee notes state that even sources of
electronic information that are claimed to be ‘inaccessible’ under amended Rule 26(b)(2)
must be identified categorically in a party’s initial disclosures under Rule 26(a).”).
95
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C) (“[U]nless a different time is set by stipulation or court
order.”).
96
See THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS: GUIDELINES FOR
DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION (2006), available at
http://www.ksduscourts.gov/guidelines/electronicdiscoveryguidelines.pdf (“If the
responding party is not searching or does not plan to search sources containing
potentially responsive information, it should identify the category or type of such
information.”).
97
It would make sense to articulate the planned limits on discovery from inaccessible
sources in sufficient detail to ensure that the position is preserved.
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VII. CONDITIONS OF DISCOVERY/COST-SHIFTING
[40] Courts usefully employ cost-shifting as a nuanced tool to adjust court
ordered discovery where the balance between benefit and burden is
uncertain.98 The authority to issue protective orders under Rule 26(c)
necessarily includes the ability to deny discovery or shift costs, regardless
of the type of discovery sought or the accessibility of the information to
the responding party.99
[41] A court which orders discovery from inaccessible sources for “good
cause” under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) “may [also] specify conditions.” The court
can, for example, limit the scope and extent of the discovery sought;100
stagger the sequence of discovery by requiring resort to the most
accessible sources; order sampling of inaccessible sources to further assess
the likely burdens and costs101 or utilize cost shifting to mitigate some of
the costs or burdens involved. Costs have been shifted, since the
Amendments, in cases involving discovery of information on backup
media102 and on hard drives,103 subject to a third party subpoena.104
[42] The Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) has been construed as
cementing a linkage between a finding of inaccessibility and cost

98

See Panel Discussion, Managing Electronic Discovery: Views from the Judges, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2007).
99
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)(A party “may invoke
the district court’s discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant orders protecting him from ‘undue
burden or expense’ in doing so, including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting
party’s payment of the costs of discovery.”).
100
See Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 641 (D. Kan. 2006) (restricting
scope of search required).
101
AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 444 (2007)( “[R]estoration of
one-fourth of the backup tapes should be adequate to determine whether the tapes are
liley to possess relevant evidence”); see also In re Natural Gas Commodity Litig., 235
F.R.D. 199, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that legacy computers are to be tested by
sampling).
102
In re Veeco Instruments Sec. Litig., No. 05 MD 1695 (CM) (GAY), 2007 WL 983987
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007).
103
Thielen v. Buongiorno USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-16, 2007 WL 465680 (W.D. Mich.
Feb. 8, 2007).
104
Guy Chem. Co. v. Romaco AG, 243 F. R. D. 310 (N.D. Ind. 2007).
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shifting.105 However, “[t]he amended rule does not say that judges may
only consider cost allocation if the subject of the discovery . . .is not
reasonably accessible.”106 The result turns on the burden or cost of
discovery, not the lack of accessibility of the source.107 Early cases
refused to use “an ironclad formula” in light of the need for a case by case
resolution.108 Not until 2003 did a court create a hierarchy of application
of the factors while tying the right to consider cost shifting to the lack of
accessibility of the information sought.109
[43] Pre-amendment multi-factor tests create unnecessary confusion. As
one court wryly observed, the considerations cited in the Committee Note
merge the multi-factor cost shifting tests from prominent pre-Amendment
decisions with a “duplicate[ion] [of] a step or two.”110 In Guy Chemical
Company v. Romaco, however, the court noted that it was not required to
follow any particular test or formulate where the need for allocation was
clear under the circumstances - and exercised its discretion to do so.111 It

105

Peskoff v. Faber, 240 F.R.D. 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2007) (“The obvious negative corollary
of [the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2)(B)] is that accessible data must be
produced at the cost of the producing party; cost-shifting does not even become a
possibility unless there is first a finding of inaccessibility.”). In a subsequent opinion, the
court appeared to affirm its conclusion. See Peskoff v. Faber, 224 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.D.C.
2007) (leaving open the possibility that an alternative ground-waiver by failure to timely
raise Rule 26(b)(2)(B) - also applied).
106
Rosenthal, supra note 93, 116 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 167 at 180.
107
See David Lender, Cost Shifting Under the New Rules: Is The Landscape Changing?,
THE FED. LAW., Aug. 2007, at 4, 5-6; see also Christopher Boehning and Daniel J. Toal,
‘Peskoff,’ Cost-Shifting and Accessible Data, N.Y.L.J., June 26, 2007, at 5 (questioning
the validity of confining cost-shifting to inaccessible sources regardless of burdens
involved).
108
See Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 463 (D. Utah 1985) (listing the reasons
which persuaded the court to exercise its discretion).
109
See Zubulake v. USB Warburg, LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (announcing a seven factor test).
110
PSEG Power New York, Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., 2007 WL 2687670, at
*11, n. 6) (N.D. N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (refusing to shift costs incurred when a discovery
vendor separated e-mail from its attachments).
111
See Guy Chem. Co. v. Romaco AG, 243 F.R.D. 310, 312 (N.D. Ind. 2007) (“This
Court has discretion in determining the appropriate remedy, and finds is unnecessary to
engage in such an analysis.”).
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also left open the possibility that attorneys’ fees might be shifted under
some circumstances.112
[44] The costs to cull and review material for relevance and privilege are
as much of the costs of discovery as restoration, and can be unduly
burdensome or expensive where the volume is high.113 Advanced
techniques, which supplement the traditional model of individual human
review on a document by document basis, are increasingly deployed either
internally at a corporation or through hosted vendor service providers.114
[45] In Chemie v. PPG Industries, Inc.,115 the court held that because
privilege review in that case was such a “daunting task,” the costs of
searching for documents and preparing a privilege log would be “open to
further discussion [and] [i]t may be that some cost sharing is warranted.”
In Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP,116 a party sought to shift all review
costs, including “such privilege-related filters as [a] court may impose,”
and Principle 13 of the Sedona Principles117 emphasizes that the “costs of
retrieving and reviewing” electronic information may be shifted in
appropriate cases.

112

But see Zubulake v. USB Warburg, LLC (“Zubulake III”), 216 F.R.D. 280, 290
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (expressing the courts opinion that “only the costs of restoration and
searching should be shifted” because, among other reasons, “any cost of reviewing” can
be avoided by entering into “claw-back” agreements allowing parties to forgo privilege
review altogether).
113
Laura E. Ellsworth & Robert Pass, Cost Shifting in Electronic Discovery, 5 Sedona
Conf. J. 125, 131 (2004).
114
At the risk of over-simplification, these technologies, informed by knowledge of the
issues in dispute, help identify key relationships and terminology and permit early
analysis of and reduction in the volume (“culling”) of individual information requiring
manual review for relevance or privilege. The degree to which this process is well suited
for accurate identification or exclusion of privileged information is very much at issue,
with a spectrum of competing opinions in existence.
115
218 F.R.D. 416, 422 (D. Del. Oct. 8, 2003).
116
Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, No. M8-85 (PART 1)(CSH), 2007 WL 473703
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007) (transferring case to Delaware District Court).
117
Sedona Principle 13, supra note 48, provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f the
information sought is not reasonably available to the responding party in the ordinary
course of business, then, absent special circumstances, the costs of retrieving and
reviewing t such electronic information may be shared by or shifted to the requesting
party.”
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XIII. THE IMPACT ON PRESERVATION OBLIGATIONS
[46] One of the key goals of the 2006 Amendments was to encourage
early discussion and agreement on preservation issues.118 A producing
party can face a Hobson’s choice between the burden and cost of
preservation and the risk of sanctions for failing to adequately meet its
obligations. The mandatory meet and confer process required by Rule
26(f) is intended to help by reducing post-discovery spoliation disputes.119
[47] The Amendments do not directly regulate the pre-discovery
obligations to preserve potential sources of such information, a task left to
the common law. The mere fact that information exists on sources which
are not reasonably accessible does not resolve the preservation analysis.120
Parties may not “exploit the routine operation of an information system to
thwart discovery obligations by allowing that operation to continue in
order to destroy specific stored information that it is required to
preserve.”121
[48] Emerging post-Amendment cases have clarified, however, that a
requesting party disregards the opportunity to raise a preservation issue at
its peril. The triggering event is actual knowledge that the information
will be sought in discovery. Absent awareness of the need to act to retain
specific sources of electronic information, a presumption of reasonable
118

See Thomas Y. Allman, Managing Preservation Obligations After the 2006 Federal
E-Discovery Amendments, 13 RICH. J. L. & TECH 9, 14-23, 26 (2007) (“ [A]bsent
agreement with opposing counsel, unilateral preservation decisions about inaccessible
sources always carry some risk of post-production challenge for potential spoliation.”).
119
See Michael R. Nelson & Mark H. Rosenberg, A Duty Everlasting: The Perils of
Applying Traditional Doctrines of Spoliation to Electronic Discovery, 12 RICH. J. L. &
TECH. 14, 44-45 (2006).
It should help to ensure that all parties are on notice as to the precise
scope of their preservation obligations [and] encourage parties to strike
reasonable compromises with regard to these obligations, in accordance
with the . . . Committee Note’s statement that “[t]he parties’ discussion
should pay particular attention to the balance between the competing
needs to preserve relevant evidence ad to continue routine operations
critical to ongoing activities.
120
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), Committee Note (2006) (“A party’s identification of
sources of electronically stored information as not reasonably accessible does not relieve
the party of its common-law or statutory duties to preserve evidence.”).
121
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37, Committee Note (2006).
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compliance attaches to steps undertaken by producing parties in good
faith.122 In Healthcare Advocates v. Harding, Early, Follmer &
Frailey,123 no duty to retain electronic screen shots was found when the
producing party neither “knew or should have known” that temporary
cache files would be sought in litigation.124 A similar result was reached
in Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell,125 where the court refused to find a duty
to preserve information in RAM, where the producing party had no reason
to anticipate the claim, and the requesting party first raised it in a motion
for sanctions.126 In Petcouo v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,127 the
court refused to sanction a party for failing to impose an entity-wide

122

See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES
FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, PRINCIPLE SIX (2d ed. 2007),

available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf
(“Responding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and
technologies appropriate for preserving and producing their own electronically stored
information.”).
123
Healthcare Advocates v. Harding, Early, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 64041 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
124
Id. at 641 (“[T]hey had no reason to believe that their activities would subject them to
a lawsuit for ‘hacking,’ [and the failure to preserve] is not an action that shocks the
conscience.”).
125
Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMC-JCX, 2007 WL 2080419 (C.D.
Cal. May 29, 2007), motion to review denied, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(requiring future production of information temporarily stored in RAM for less than six
hours); see Thomas Y. Allman & Kevin F. Brady, Can Random Access Memory Make
Good Law?, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 10, 2007, at E1 (noting that a requirement to place
information into a usable form for production under Rule 34 with a “modicum of
cooperation” is consistent with existing legal principles, particularly when the
information is not available elsewhere).
126
The magistrate judge held that “the defendants’ failure to retain the Server Log Data in
RAM was based on a good faith belief that preservation of data temporarily stored only
in RAM was not legally required” because, inter alia, there had been “no specific request
by the defendants to preserve Serve Log Data present solely in RAM.” Columbia
Pictures, 2007 WL 2080419, at *14. During a colloquy about the case at the 2007
Georgetown Law Center E-Discovery Conference, the point was made by a magistrate
judge that there may very well be occasions when the duty to preserve such information
will be obvious, and steps may have to be undertaken to preserve well before discovery is
sought.
127
No. 1:06-CV-2157-HTW-GGB, 2008 WL 542684 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 25, 2008) (“It does
not appear that Defendant acted in bad faith in following its established policy for
retention and destruction of e-mails.”).
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preservation order on the deletion of e-mails, where the requesting party
had not indicated the need to do so.128
[49] The focus should be on the likelihood of unique and discoverable
information residing on the source at issue. There is no duty to preserve
duplicative information which may be available on more accessible
sources. As explained by the former Chair of the Advisory Committee,
“[a] primary factor to consider [in deciding whether or not to act to
preserve inaccessible sources of information] is whether the information
likely to be found on those sources is also available on other, reasonably
accessible sources.” 129 Thus, in Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O
Lakes, Inc.,130 the court held that the duty to preserve “would not
automatically include information maintained on inaccessible computer
backup tapes.”131 In that case, the court relied upon testimony by the
General Counsel that he believed that the information was available on
other accessible sources.132
[50] Similarly, in Escobar v. City of Houston,133 the court refused to issue
sanctions based on the overwriting of a tape of police communications,
where the information was available elsewhere, and there was no showing
of bad faith in the operation of the system.

128

See also Marketfare Annunciation, LLC v. United Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., No.
06-07232, 2007 WL 3273440 (E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2007) (refusing to consider a motion for
sanctions because the preservation issue was not raised in a timely manner “as opposed to
bypassing this step in the discovery process and seeking sanctions directly.”).
129
Lee H. Rosenthal, Not Reasonably Accessible Information and Allocating Discovery
Costs, YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167 (2006).
130
Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 628 (D. Colo.
2007) (stating that a reasonable investigation to identify and preserve relevant materials
does not generally include inaccessible back-up tapes).
131
In Miller v. Holzmann, No. 95-01231 (RCL/JMF), 2007 WL 172327, at *6 (D.D.C.
Jan. 17, 2007, the court noted that Sedona Principle 5 accurately captured the evolving
case law and applied it to the case before it.
132
Citing to Zubulake v. UBS Warburg (“Zubulake IV”), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
133
Escobar v. City of Houston, No. 04-1956, 2007 WL 2900581 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29,
2007).
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[51] The presumption of rational activity in Escobar was reinforced by
the provisions of Rule 37(e), formerly Rule 37(f).134 This provision was
added to the 2006 Amendments to regulate rule-based sanctions for losses
incurred as the result of routine operations,135 despite implementation of a
reasonable litigation hold.136 However, willful continuance of a routine
operation involving destruction, when preservation obligations are known
to apply, is not an example of “good faith” operation of that system.137 In
Disability Rights Council v. WMTA,138 the Magistrate Judge noted a
failure (which the court described as “indefensible”) to prevent the
automatic deletion of e-mails, including “possibly relevant and
discoverable e-mails.”139
[52] Rule 37(e) represents a useful guidepost which balances the need for
discovery with the practical constraints on information system operations.
It is consistent with holdings in a majority of circuits,140 which hold that
destruction of information pursuant to a reasonable records retention

134

Rule 37(e), as renumbered by the 2007 Amendments without change in textual matter,
provides that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as
a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.”
135
See Thomas Y. Allman, Defining Culpability: The Search for a Limited Safe Harbor
in Electronic Discovery, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 65, 66-67, 77-78, 82 (2007).
136
Comments 5c and 5d to Sedona Principle 5 recommend use of a “repeatable,
documented” process in implementing “legal” or “litigation” holds, a topic which is now
the subject of The Sedona Conference® Commentary on Legal Holds. See The Sedona
Conference® Commentary on Legal Holds: The Trigger & The Process (Aug. 2007
Public Comment Version), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org; accord In
re Kmart Corporation, 371 B.R. 823, 847 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill. July 31, 2007) (finding no
evidence that the party knew that discoverable evidence was been destroyed as part of the
operation of its retention policies).
137
It is clear that a party may not “exploit” a routine operation “in order to destroy
specific stored information that it is required to preserve.” See Committee Note, Rule
37(f). The Committee Note points out that “good faith” may require active intervention
in the routine operation of some inaccessible sources of information as part of a
“litigation hold.”
138
242 F.R.D. 139 (D.D.C. June 1, 2007).
139
Id. at *146 (noting that users may defeat the automatic deletion by arching the email,
which a majority of employees did not do).
140
See Stevenson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir.
2004)(holding that “some indication of an intent to destroy the evidence for the purpose
of obstructing or suppressing the truth” is required).
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system is not spoliation absent a deliberate intent to interfere with
litigation.141
[53] Finally, no duty to preserve inaccessible sources exists where
disproportionate efforts are required which outweigh the potential
benefits.142 Drawing that line is not easy. In Cache La Pourdre Fees,
LLC v. Land O’ Lakes, Inc.,143 the trial court faulted an entity for its
failure to preserve hard drives of former key employees. For that reason,
effective use of early opportunities to discuss and confirm preservation
steps undertaken is advisable.
[54] Meeting preservation obligations should be treated as part of a
commitment to effective compliance. Increasingly, entities that can afford
to do so are dedicating IT personnel and counsel to the task of
coordinating and managing the process. This is usually accompanied by
improved consistency in approach, better training of internal personnel,
and enhanced processes and procedures.

IX. METADATA OR EMBEDDED DATA
[55] Operating systems and software applications generate a variety of
types of information, including “metadata and embedded data,” which are
not typically visible to the viewer as part of the image visible on a

141

While Residential Funding Corporation v. DeGeorge Financial Corp , 306 F.3d 99,
107-8 (2d Cir. 2002) may be seen as more strict in regard to mere negligence, Rule 37(e)
represents a collective judgment by the Rules Committees and Congress that a broader
range of protection is preferable for policy reasons in the limited field of losses from
routine, good faith operation of information systems.
142
“Electronic discovery burdens should be proportional to the amount in controversy
and the nature of the case. Otherwise, transaction costs due to electronic discovery will
overwhelm the ability to resolve disputes fairly in litigation.” THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES:
BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 17 (2d ed. 2007), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf
at 17.
143
Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC 244 F.R.D. at 629 (“By wiping clean the computer hard
drives of former employees who had worked on the [project], Land O’Lakes effectively
eliminated a readily accessible source of potentially relevant information”).
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screen.144 Access to and production of that information may involve
burdens and costs yet to be essential to the resolution of an issue.145
[56] Discovery of metadata or embedded data is regulated by a hybrid and
somewhat tentative approach in the 2006 Amendments, given the
uncertainty of the Advisory Committee on the best way to proceed.146
Increasingly, District Courts provide local guidance to ensure that the
issue will be resolved by early agreement,147 local rule,148 or by the terms
of a case management order.149

144

See FED R. CIV. P. 26(f), Committee Note (2006). The characteristics of the form of
production roughly correspond to degree to which some or all of this type of data is
included. See Electronic Discovery Reference Model, Production – Form of Production,
available at http://www.edrm.net/wiki/index.php/Production_-_Form_of_Production
(distinguishing between production of electronic information in the form of Paper, QuasiPaper, Quasi-Native and Native production, with the least amount of metadata and
embedded data (none) reproduced in “paper” production and the most in “native”
production).
145
There are valid reasons for a party to prefer to produce information as an “image”
without metadata, even though it might be more expensive to do so than simply
producing in “native” form. The process is complicated by concerns about the
inadvertent production and receipt of metadata. See generally J. Brian Beckham,
Production, Preservation and Disclosure of Metadata, 7 Colum. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1
(2006).
146
The minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee reveal that the rule
makers decided to remain silent on whether to require parties to
produce metadata and preferred to leave the issue to the courts,
presumably because electronic discovery was such a new and changing
area of law that the Committee was not confident in setting down a firm
and inflexible rule.
Lucia Cucu, Note, The Requirement for Metadata Production Under Williams v.
Sprint/United Management Co: An Unnecessary Burden for Litigants Engaged in
Electronic Discovery, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 224 (2007) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
Advisory Committee’s minutes, Apr. 15, 2005, *25, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC0405.pdf). The Committee was concerned
about having the “unintended effect” of implying that metadata and embedded should be
automatically produced. FED. R. CIV. P. Advisory Committee’s minutes, Apr. 15, 2005 at
*22, *25.
147
“Meta-Data, especially substantive Meta-Data, need not be routinely produced, except
[by agreement or] upon a showing of good cause in a motion filed by the Requesting
Party.” See D. Md., Suggested Protocol for Discovery of Electronically Stored
Information, 26 (unpublished report), available at
http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/news/news/ESIProtocol.pdf (alteration in orginal).
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[57] For parties litigating without guidance from local rules, Rules 16(b),
26(f), and 34(b) collectively govern how parties are to frame the issue in
advance of collection and processing. While a party need not specify
preferred form or forms for production, it is encouraged.150 The issue
should be raised early if it is going to be material to a case. 151 In
D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Group, Inc.,152 a failure of the original discovery
requests to clearly request information in its original format, with
metadata, was fatal to a motion to compel.153
[58] A producing party is obligated by Rule 34 to state the form or forms
it intends to use. Absent an agreement, Rule 34(a) provides that
production should be made “in a form or forms in which [the information
at issue] is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably
usable.”154
[59] When a court must rule on the topic, a process of assessing good
cause, subject to the proportionality principle of Rule 26(b)(2)(C), is

148

See Wyeth v. Impax Labs., No. Civ. A. 06-222-JJF, 2006 WL 3091331, at *3 (D. Del.
Oct. 26, 2006) (applying Delaware Default Standard approving production in imaged
files).
149
See In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1769, 2007 WL 219989, at *4 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 26, 2007) (specifying format for production including metadata fields and providing
process for resolution of disputes).
150
“Whether [metadata and embedded data] should be produced may be among the topics
discussed in the Rule 26(f) conference. If it is, it may need to be reviewed to ensure that
no privileged information is included, further complicating the task of privilege review.”
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f), Committee Note (2006) (alternation in original).
151
In Kentucky Speedway v. NASCAR, No. 05-138-WOB, 2006 WL 5097354, at *8
(E.D. Ky. Dec. 18, 2006), the court noted the need for parties to discuss the topic in the
Rule 26(f) conference and refused to require reproduction in native format where it had
not occurred.
152
247 F.R.D. 43 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2008).
153
Id. at 48 (collecting cases and citing to blog arguing that “in order to obtain metadata, .
. .you should specifically ask for it to begin with”).
154
In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., No. C-04-02676 CRB, 2007 WL 1827635, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. June 25, 2007). “The rule . . . provides that the form of electronic production
required under the new rule may be altered by agreement of the parties or by order of the
Court.” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i)-(ii)). The choice of form or forms
necessarily dictates whether and to what extent metadata is sought under the
circumstances.
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employed. In O’Bar v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc.,155 for example, the
local guidelines provided that even where “Meta-Data” is relevant, “it
[may] not be reasonably subject to discovery given the Rule 26(b)(2)(C)”
factors.”156 A court should take into account the role that metadata and
embedded data are expected to play, balanced against the burden and costs
involved.157
[60] In performing the balancing required, a court should also consider
the impact of any enhanced privilege review required if there is a credible
risk implicating the privilege. For example, cases involving patent, unfair
competition, trademark, and antitrust often raise disproportionate review
concerns where metadata may include privileged material.158
[61] Courts have successfully resolved a number of disputes since the
2006 Amendments using this hybrid approach. In Michigan First Credit
Union v. Cumis Insurance Society,159 the court sustained an objection to
production “along with intact metadata” because “production of this
metadata would be overly burdensome with no corresponding evidentiary

155

O’Bar v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 5:04-cv-000190W, 2007 WL 1299180, at *4
n.2, n.4 (W.D.N.C. May 2, 2007) (basing Guidelines on D. Md., Suggested Protocol for
Discovery of Electronically Stored Information 25, (unpublished report) available at
http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/news/news/ESIProtocol.pdf).
156
Id. at *4, n. 3.
157
Absent party agreement or court order specifying the form or forms of
production, production should be made in the form or forms in which
the information is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form,
taking into account the need to produce reasonably accessible metadata
that will enable the receiving party to have the same ability to access,
search, and display the information as the producing party where
appropriate or necessary in light of the nature of the information and
the needs of the case.
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 17 (2d ed. 2007), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_PRINCP_2d_ed_607.pdf.
158
See Jack E. Pace, III & John D. Rue, Early Reflections on E-Discovery in Antitrust
Litigation: Ten Months Into the New Regime, 22 ANTITRUST 67, 69 (2007) (“[T]he costs
associated with just the additional privilege review that would be necessary for each and
every production of ESI (including metadata) could be staggering.”).
159
Michigan First Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, No. 05-74423, 2007 WL 4098213,
at *2-3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2007).
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value.” Also, in the case of Schmidt v. Levi Strauss & Co.,160 the court
rejected a motion to compel reproduction in “native, electronic” format
because the “the apparent burden and expense of such an undertaking”
was held to “dwarf any benefit,” citing to Rule 26 (b)(2)(C).
X. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
[62] Astute observers were initially critical of the “two-tiered” approach
because undue burden or cost in discovery could have been addressed by
the existing limitations on discovery found in Rule 26(b).161 Some argued
that the addition of a “good cause” requirement would not alter outcomes
and constituted a meaningless cosmetic change.162
[63] Fairly read, the results of the decisions applying Rule 26(b)(2)(B) are
not much different from those which one would have expected under preAmendment case law. Although “good cause” is often dutifully (and
mechanically) referenced, the courts are, in fact, focused primarily on
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), since it ultimately determines whether electronically
stored information is discoverable, regardless of the accessibility of the
source.163
[64] Thus, the question raised by the critics remains: was the Advisory
Committee justified in introducing yet another a “good cause” requirement
160

Schmidt v. Levi Strauss & Co., No. C04-01026 RMW (HRL), 2007 WL 2688467, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007).
161
See Comment 04-CV-179, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
February 15, 2005, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/04-CV179.pdf. (“Rule 26(b)(2) already sets out the factors a court should consider in
determining whether otherwise permissible discovery should be limited by the court.”).
162
See Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 89-91 (2007), available at
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v21/NOYES_Good_Cause_Is_Bad_ Medicine.pdf
(suggesting that the Advisory Committee knew the good cause standard would be
“toothless and meaningless” but was adopted as a “somewhat Solomonic action” to cater
to demands of defense lawyers while reassuring plaintiffs’ lawyers that the court would
rely on the “familiar and friendly mantra of liberal discovery to interpret the vague good
cause standard.”).
163
See Panel Discussion, Managing Electronic Discovery: Views from the Judges, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 23 (October 2007) (stating courts may “pass by” the “almost
mechanical burden-shifting procedure” because “even if it is accessible, the value is so
outweighed by the burden here that I am not going to require production.”) (Francis, J.).
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in the Federal Rules?164 It was certainly not a given. After the original
proposal165 was criticized, the Committee considered, but rejected, a draft
which did not mention “good cause.”166 Both the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)167 and the Conference
of Chief Justices168 have adopted that approach.169
[65] The “good cause” requirement has come to play an important role in
party-managed discovery. That process “offers litigants the opportunity to
work toward agreement, rather than impasse, in defining the scope of
164

See Judges, Lawyers, and the New Rules, 43 TRIAL 20, 22 (Apr. 2007) (“[I]n the end,
we have to use the same test to determine whether discovery should go forward – the socalled proportionality rule, which had been Rule 26(b)(2) and is now 26(b)(2)(C). That
rule provides that a judge can deny or limit or condition a discovery request that is too
burdensome or expensive.”) (Hedges).
165
It was originally proposed that a court may “order discovery of the [not reasonably
accessible] information for good cause.” See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO
THE STANDING COMMITTEE at 6 (May 17, 2004, revised Aug. 3, 2004), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.pdf.
166
Id. at lines 1435-1512 (“[a] requesting party may obtain an order for discovery of the
[not reasonably accessible] information by showing that it is consistent with [then] Rule
26(b)(2)(B).”).
167
See UNIF. R. RELATING TO THE DISCOVERY OF ELECT. STORED INFO. R. 8(c) (Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Oct. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/udoera/2007_final.htm.
The court may order discovery of electronically stored information that
is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or expense if the party requesting discovery shows that the
likely benefit of the proposed discovery outweighs the likely burden or
expense, taking into account the amount in controversy, the resources
of the parties, the importance of the issues, and the importance of the
requested discovery in resolving the issues.
168
See GUIDELINES FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS REGARDING DISCOVERY OF ELECT.STORED INFO. R. 5 (Conference of Chief Justices, Aug., 2006), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/images/EDiscCCJGuidelinesFinal.pdf (“If the requested
information is subject to production, a judge should then weigh the benefits to the
requesting party against the burden and expense of the discovery for the responding
party, considering such factors as: [listing 13 factors].”).
169
California has issued an Invitation to Comment on e-discovery proposals which adopt
a “good cause” requirement for discovery from inaccessible sources in Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.060 (Protective Orders). See Invitation to Comment, (LEG-08-01/W08-01) (Jan.,
2008), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/invitationstocomment/documents/w0801.pdf. The proposal engrafts the amendment on a structure built on the NCCUSL
Uniform Rules, Rule 8 (Limitation on Discovery), subdivision (c).
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discovery for the various sources of electronically stored information
potentially discoverable in their case.”170 Increased efficiency in that
effort was at the forefront of the Committee concerns.171 Professor
Marcus, the Consultant to the Committee, has explained that the Advisory
Committee felt that absent an explicit “two-tiered” approach, a party
would be required to filing motions for protective orders each time the
accessibility issue was sought to be raised.172
[66] Thus, the answer to the criticism is not to be found by examining the
outcomes of contested cases - they have not changed - but by looking at
the day to day conduct of party managed discovery.
[67] Anecdotal evidence shows that parties have absorbed the value
judgment involved. The “good cause” requirement acts as a proxy for the
judgment that discovery should concentrate on accessible sources and
careful attention to be paid to balancing potential benefit against any
burdens, if it is to go beyond them. There appears to be a heightened
attention to discovery from accessible sources before burdensome
electronic discovery is required. Parties are increasingly tempering their
demands and reaching practical and effective accommodations under
circumstances which did not exist before.
[68] On balance, therefore, and despite the cumbersome nature of the
Rule, it would appear that the benefits more than justify the decision by
the Advisory Committee to introduce the “two-tiered” system of electronic
discovery.

170

See Theodore C. Hirt, The Two-Tier Discovery Provision of Rule 26(B)(2)(B) – A
Reasonable Measure for Controlling Electronic Discovery?, 13 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 12 at
¶ 1, ¶43 (2007), available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v13i3/article12.pdf (“[T]his
Rule should assist the parties and the court in establishing a reasonable path through the
electronic discovery process.”).
171
“Rule 26(b)(2)(B) does not create new authority for judges to limit discovery or to
allocate the costs of that discovery.” Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic
Discovery After December 1, 2006, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167, 181 (2006).
172
Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World or 1984?, 236
F.R.D. 598, 614 (2006) (“Requiring a motion or court action every time a Rule 34 request
sought information that might be contained on backup tapes or in legacy data could be a
gross waste of judicial and litigant time.”).
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APPENDIX
Evolution of the Two-Tiered Approach (1999 – 2007)
Date
1983

1999
2002
2003
March

Meeting, Report or Action
Rule 26(b)(2)(iii)(the “proportionality principle”) added to
limit discovery when “burden or expense” of proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit
E-Discovery issues first raised at Public Hearings on thencurrent Discovery Amendments
Initial Sedona Conference on E-Discovery held in Phoenix,
Arizona
Public Comment version of The Sedona Principles issued

Discovery Subcommittee Memo suggests adapting Texas
April Rule 196.4 relating to “reasonably available” information for
14
use in Federal Rules (available at
http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/index.html)
(navigate to Memo) (last visited Jan. 28, 2008)
May 1- Advisory Committee authorizes Subcommittee to begin
2
drafting e-discovery proposals (Minutes available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC0503.pdf)
(last visited Jan. 28, 2008)
Sept 15 Discovery Subcommittee Memo raises issue of requiring
good cause for production of inaccessible data (available at
http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/civilrules/marcus09
1503b.pdf) (last visited Jan. 28, 2008)
2004 “Conference on Electronic Discovery” held at Fordham Law
Feb
School, New York City [Draft Proposals furnished to
20-21 participants] (available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscovery_Conf_Agenda_
Materials.pdf)
April The Sedona Principles (First Edition) issued
April 5 Discovery Subcommittee Memo recommends requiring a
court order before obtaining information that is not
reasonably accessible (available at
http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/civilrules/marcus04
0604.pdf)(last visited Jan. 28, 2008)
April Advisory Committee approves concept of limitation keyed
34
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to reasonable accessibility with good cause for discovery
(Minutes available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC0404.pdf)
(last visited Jan. 28, 2008)
May
Advisory Committee Report (contains draft Rule and
17
Committee Note) (available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV5-2004.pdf) (last
visited Jan. 28, 2008)
June Standing Committee Meeting approves draft proposals for
17-18 publication (Minutes available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/june2004.pdf) (last
visited Jan. 28, 2008)
August Advisory Committee Report (May 17, revised August 3)
3
(revised draft Rule 26(b) and Rule 45(d) and Committee
Notes (Report available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment
2005/CVAug04.pdf) (last visited Jan. 28, 2008)
2005 Public Hearings on Proposed E-discovery Amendments held
Jan/Fe in San Francisco, Dallas, and Washington (index to
b
comments and transcripts available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery.html) (last visited
Jan. 28, 2008)
April Advisory Committee revises proposed Amendments and
14-15 Committee Notes (Minutes available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRACO405.pdf.)
(last visited Jan. 28, 2008)
May
Advisory Committee Report (contains revised Amendments
27
and Committee Notes) (available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CV5-2005.pdf) (last visited
Jan. 28, 2008)
June Standing Committee approves and revises Rules and Notes
15-16 (Minutes available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/MinutesST_June_2005.pdf)
(last visited Jan. 28, 2008)
July 27 Amended Advisory Committee Report (May 27, revised
July 27) (contains Final Rule 26(b) and Rule 45(d) and
Committee Notes, as revised after Standing Committee
Meeting [“Final Report 2005”])(see September, 2005).
35

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
Sept

Volume XIV, Issue 3

Standing Committee Report to Judicial Conference
(includes: Standing Committee Memo, with Final Advisory
Committee Report of May 27, 2005 (revised July 25, 2005)
as Appendix C, together with Appendix F summarizing pros
and cons of amendments) (available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf) (last
visited Jan. 28, 2008)
Sept 20 Judicial Conference approves Amendments and Committee
Notes
Sept 30 Judicial Conference Report to Chief Justice (recommending
approval) (available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Supct1105/Summary_Propos
ed_Amendments.pdf) (last visited Jan. 28, 2008)
2006 Supreme Court approves Final Rules and Committee Notes
April and transmits to Congress.(available at
12
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Letters_Orders.pdf) (last
visited Jan. 28, 2008) (full text of Rules and Committee
Notes available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscovery_w_Notes.pdf)
(last visited Jan. 28, 2008)
Dec 1 Effective Date of the 2006 E-Discovery Amendments
(available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscovery_w_Notes.pdf)
(last visited Jan. 28, 2008)
2007 Effective Date of 2007 “sylistic” Amendments (Text of
Dec 1 amended Rule 26 and Rule 45 remains essentially identical;
new descriptive headings are added) (available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1106/CV_CLEAN_FIN
AL5-30-07.pdf ) (last visited Jan. 28, 2008)
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